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Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEW's deadline.
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998),
the Supreme Court discussed the
basis for an employer's liability
when a supervisor engages in sexual
harassment. The Court began its
analysis by looking for guidance to
general principles of agency law,
which addresses the liability of
employers for the tortious acts of
their agents. Under agency principles employers can be liable for
their agent's acts if, among other
things, the agent was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship.
Applying this concept to supervisory
harassment, the Court held that
when the supervisor takes a "tangible employment action" against the
employee, the injury that results
from that action could not have
occurred were it not for the fact
that the agent had been given
authority by the employer to take

the action. The supervisor has been
empowered by the employer to
make decisions that affect the
employees under his control. The
supervisor uses this official power to
make the decision and thus the
decision becomes the act of the
employer. For example, when the
supervisor fires an employee
because she refused his sexual
advances, the supervisor's act is, in
effect, the act of the employer for
which the employer is liable.
The Court noted that even when the
supervisor's harassing conduct does
not result in a tangible employment
action, he is still aided by the
agency relation because his power
and authority, given to him by the
company, "invests his harassing
conduct with a particular threatening character." But, the Court cautioned, often a supervisor's harassing conduct will be similar in kind
to the type of harassment engaged
in by co-workers (e.g., sexual com-
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Title XII holds an
employer strictly liable
for a supervisor's sexually

harassing conduct that
culminates in a tangible
employment action. In
this case the Court must
decide whether a constructive discharge
caused by supervisory
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ments and inappropriate touching),
and the fact of his supervisory status will make little difference. This
tension between the supervisor's
status and the similarity of certain
harassing conduct with that engaged
in by co-workers led the Court to
conclude that some limits need to
be placed on the employer's liability
for the supervisor's harassing conduct. The Court found that Title VII
provided certain policy considerations to take into account when
fashioning the limitations on
employer liability.
According to the Court, Title VII "is
designed to encourage the creation
of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms."
Limiting employer liability where
such policies and mechanisms exist
would encourage employers to create such policies and encourage
employees to report harassment,
thereby serving the deterrent purposes of Title VII. Based on these
factors, the Court developed the following rule for imposing liability on
the employer when the supervisor's
harassing conduct does not include
a tangible employment action: an
employer is liable for the hostile
environment created by the supervisor's conduct unless the employer
can prove that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassing conduct (such as by the
promulgation of a policy with a
complaint procedure) and that the
employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive
or corrective measures available
(such as by not using a complaint
procedure).
The Court concluded by emphasizing that this affirmative defense is
not available when the supervisor's
harassment results in a tangible
employment action for which the
employer remains strictly liable.

ISSUE
Is a constructive discharge caused
by a supervisor's harassing conduct
a tangible employment action for
which the employer is strictly liable,
or can the employer assert the affirmative defense to avoid liability?
FACTS
Nancy Drew Suders was employed
by the Pennsylvania State Police
from March 23 to August 20, 1998.
During her employment she was
continuously subjected to namecalling, explicit sexual gestures,
obscene and offensive conversation
and the posting of vulgar images.
Those responsible for the harassing
conduct included her supervisors.
Twice during her tenure she spoke
with the Equal Employment
Opportunity officer for the
Pennsylvania State Police. The first
time she vaguely alluded to the fact
that she might need some help, but
neither Suders nor the officer pursued the matter. The second time,
she specifically mentioned that she
was being harassed and that she was
afraid, but the officer was singularly
unhelpful, telling her to file a complaint on a standard form without
telling Suders where to obtain the
form.
For Suders, the straw that broke the
camel's back occurred on August 20,
when her supervisors allegedly set
her up for a false accusation of
theft. She was arrested, handcuffed,
photographed, and interrogated,
whereupon she resigned.
Suders filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging, among other
things, a violation of Title VII.
Specifically, she claimed that the
supervisors' harassing conduct was
so severe and pervasive as to create
a hostile work environment and
that, as a result, she had no alternative but to resign. This forced resig-

nation constituted a constructive
discharge for which the employer
was strictly liable.
The district court granted the
motion for summary judgment filed
by the Pennsylvania State Police
and dismissed the case. The court
found that even if the supervisors
had created a sexually hostile work
environment, Suders had unreasonably failed to take advantage of the
employer's complaint procedure for
reporting harassment. Therefore,
under Ellerth, the employer could
not be liable for the supervisors'
harassing conduct. The district
court did not address Suders's claim
of constructive discharge.
On appeal, the Third Circuit
reversed the grant of summary judgment. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d
432 (3rd Cir. 2003). The court of
appeals found the district court's
analysis flawed for two reasons.
First, even if the employer could
assert the Ellerth affirmative
defense, there were genuine issues
of material fact that could not be
resolved on a motion for summary
judgment. Specifically, there was a
factual dispute as to whether Suders
had failed to use the employer's
complaint procedures given the evidence concerning the lack of effective responsiveness from the Equal
Employment Opportunity officer.
Secondly, the district court erred by
failing to consider whether a claim
of constructive discharge precludes
the availability of the Ellerth
defense. On this point the court of
appeals held that when a supervisor's harassing conduct culminates
in a constructive discharge, a tangible employment action has been
taken and thus, under Ellerth, the
employer is strictly liable.
A constructive discharge occurs
when "acts of discrimination in violation of Title VII ...
make working
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conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced
to resign." Under such circumstances, a constructive discharge is
the "functional equivalent of an
actual termination." In this case,
Suders raised genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the
supervisors' harassing conduct was
so intolerable that, given the totality
of the circumstances, a reasonable
person would have felt that she had
no other choice than to resign.
Therefore, these factual issues concerning the constructive discharge
claim precluded the grant of summary judgment.
The Third Circuit remanded the
case to the district court, finding
that a trial on the merits was
required to resolve these factual
issues. The court of appeals concluded that if Suders proves that
she was constructively discharged,
the employer is precluded from
relying on the Ellerth affirmative
defense and will be held strictly
liable for the supervisors' harassing
conduct. If Suders is unable to
prove the elements of a constructive
discharge claim, the employer will
have the opportunity to prove the
elements of the Ellerth affirmative
defense.
The Pennsylvania State Police filed
a petition for writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court, which the
Court granted. PennsylvaniaState
Police v. Suders, 124 S.Ct. 803, 157
L.Ed.2d 692 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The employer begins its argument
by reminding the Court that it has
previously rejected the concept that
employers should always be held
strictly liable for the harassing conduct of supervisors. In Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 47 U.S. 57
(1986) (the first case in which the
Court addressed the issue of sexual

harassment under Title VII), the
Court noted that Title VII places
some limits on the extent of
employer liability for the acts of its
employees, and that in determining
those limits, the courts should be
guided by general principles of
agency law.
In Ellerth, the Court used those
agency principles in drawing a distinction between those types of
supervisory acts for which an
employer would be held strictly
liable and those actions for which
the employer would have available
an affirmative defense. That line was
drawn "when a supervisor takes a
tangible employment action against
the subordinate." The Ellerth Court
defined a tangible employment
action as one that causes a significant change in employment status
and inflicts direct economic harm.
The employer is strictly liable for
such actions because they are the
type that can only be imposed by a
person acting with the authority of
the employer. When taking such
actions the supervisor brings the
official power of the employer to
bear upon the employees. Thus, it is
very clear that, pursuant to agency
principles, the supervisor is able to
take such actions because it is aided
by the existence of the agency relationship it holds vis-a-vis the
employing entity.
Where the supervisor's harassing
conduct does not result in a tangible
employment action, it is less clear
that it is aided by the existence of
the agency relationship. Sexually
crude comments and gestures can
be inflicted by anyone-co-workers,
customers, or supervisors. This type
of conduct lacks the indicia of "official" action that can be traced back
solely to the employer.
Whether a supervisor's actions are
"'aided by the agency relationship"

what the supervisor does, not on the
employee's reaction. The focus for
agency principle purposes is on the
supervisor's conduct, (i.e., was his
action aided by the agency relationship?). To focus on the employee's
reaction would lead to the nonsensical result that if the employee
resigns in response to supervisory
harassment then the employer is
strictly liable, but if the employee
toughs it out and does not resign,
the exact same supervisory conduct
is subject to an affirmative defense
to employer liability.
Moreover, unlike tangible employment actions, supervisory harassment that leads an employee to
resign is not the kind of conduct
that only a supervisor can inflict.
There are numerous examples of
employee resignations in the face of
co-worker harassment.
While it is true that a constructive
discharge effects a significant
change in employment status that
causes direct financial harm, this
change is the result of the employee's own decision rather than the
actions of the supervisor. Secondly,
this same change in status and economic harm results when the constructive discharge is in response to
co-worker harassment. Thus, this
aspect of constructive discharge is
not dispositive of whether the
employer should be held strictly
liable. The employee decision to
resign has nothing to do with
whether or not the supervisor was
aided by the agency relationship;
therefore the employee act of resignation should not affect the availability of the Ellerth affirmative
defense.
In determining principles for
employer liability, the Court in
Ellerth did not focus on the nature
of the harm to the employer but
rather on whether the supervisor

(as required by Ellerth) depends on
(Continued on Page 320)
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was aided by the agency relationship in inflicting the harm. Thus,
the availability of the affirmative
defense should depend on the
nature of the supervisor's conduct.
If a constructive discharge results
from a supervisor's tangible employment action, such as occurs when a
supervisor demotes the employee
because she rejected his sexual
advance and the employee resigns
in response, the affirmative defense
would not be available. If, however,
the constructive discharge is a
response to a hostile work environment created by the supervisor, the
affirmative defense would apply.
The United States, in its amicus
brief, takes a similar, but perhaps
more nuanced view of the issue.
The United States focuses on
whether the constructive discharge
is the result of a supervisor's "official" act, regardless of whether the
act could be defined as a "tangible
employment action."
Title VII does not explicitly refer to
the concept of constructive discharge. The statute prohibits
employers from failing or refusing to
hire, from discharging individuals,
or from discriminating with respect
to terms and conditions of employment. The courts are in uniform
agreement that the prohibition
against discharge and discrimination in terms of employment is
broad enough to hold an employer
liable when it creates discriminatory
working conditions so intolerable
that a reasonable employee has no
alternative but to resign.
In determining whether a reasonable person would find no alternative but to resign, the employer's
efforts to correct the problems, as
well as the employee's efforts to
alert the employer to the situation,
are relevant considerations. A failure to complain may indicate that
the employee did not find the condi-

tions intolerable, or that resignation
was not the only alternative (i.e.,
the employee could have complained). When an employee does
complain, the employer's failure to
correct the problem would be relevant to whether resignation became
the only alternative.
In determining whether a resignation constitutes a constructive
discharge, there may often be an
overlap between the factors for
proving constructive discharge and
the factors for proving the Ellerth
affirmative defense, such that
attempting to separate the two
issues is impossible. (For example,
if corrective opportunities are available-one of the elements of the
Ellerth affirmative defense-it would
be difficult for the employee to
prove there was no reasonable
alternative but to resign-one of
the elements for proving constructive discharge.)
In the absence of definitive guidance from the Supreme Court as to
the contours for proving a constructive discharge case, there may be
cases in which a plaintiff could
prove constructive discharge even if
she has unreasonably failed to take
advantage of corrective measures. In
such cases the issue will remain
whether the employer may assert
the Ellerth affirmative defense.
Ellerth provides the basis for
answering the latter question. Strict
liability applies when the supervisor
takes a tangible employment action
that, the Court said, "requires an
official act of the enterprise."
Ordinary workplace harassment
engaged in by a supervisor does not
require an official act of the enterprise. This type of conduct does not
depend on a grant of authority from
the employer nor is it conduct that
only a supervisor can commit.
However, when the supervisor
engages in an official act it estab-

lishes that he has been aided by the
agency relationship, thereby precluding the affirmative defense.
Official acts, in most cases, are documented and subject to review by
other corporate actors. These are
acts over which the employer maintains control and supervision. It is
this ability to control that provides
the justification for strict liability.
When there is no official act, there
is no ability for the employer to
control the conduct.
Although a constructive discharge is
functionally the same as a termination in some respects, it is different
in others. Both a constructive discharge and termination constitute a
change in employment status
imposing direct economic harm. But
with a termination, the employer
ultimately decides, whereas in a
constructive discharge, the decision
is the employee's. A company will
have a reason to review a termination decision (thereby affording the
opportunity to control the decision)
whereas it will not have a reason to
review a resignation. A termination
is always the result of an official act
of the employer, whereas a constructive discharge may be the
result of co-worker acts, unofficial
supervisory conduct, or official
company acts. Thus, the issue to
focus on is whether the constructive
discharge was caused by a supervisor's official act. Thus, a supervisor
who demotes an employee has
engaged in an official act, and if the
consequence of that act is the
employee's constructive discharge,
the employer is strictly liable.
Applying this standard to the present case requires a determination
of whether any of the actions that
caused Suders's resignation were
official acts. Name-calling, gestures,
and obscene conversation are unofficial and unauthorized supervisory
acts for which the affirmative
defense would be available. It is not
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as clear, however, whether the
supervisor's acts in allegedly falsely
accusing her of theft and arresting
her depended upon a grant of
authority from the employer and
whether it was the kind of activity
likely to be documented and subject
to review. If those supervisory acts
were official acts and Suders's resignation resulted in significant part
from those acts, then the affirmative
defense should not be available to
the employer.
Suders's argument will likely focus
on the parameters of the concept of
"tangible employment action." In
Ellerth, the Supreme Court defined
a tangible employment action as
one that "constitutes a significant
change in employment status" and
usually "inflicts direct economic
harm." There is universal agreement that a constructive discharge
is the functional equivalent of a termination. As such, it clearly results
in a significant change in employment status and definitely inflicts
direct economic harm. Although the
Ellerth Court did not specifically list
a constructive discharge as a type of
tangible employment action, the list
provided in the decision ("such as
hiring, firing, failure to promote ...")

was not intended to be exhaustive
or nonexclusive but rather was illustrative of representative actions.
The fact that a co-worker may
engage in sexually harassing conduct leading to the constructive discharge of the victim is not dispositive of the question regarding the
employer's liability when it is the
supervisor's conduct that causes the
constructive discharge. As the Court
noted in Ellerth, even "merely"
harassing conduct, without a tangible employment action, is of a different character and degree from a
co-worker's harassment, since the
power and authority given to the
supervisor by the company "invests
his harassing conduct with a partic-

ular threatening character." The
issue is not whether co-workers and
supervisors are capable of engaging
in the same type of conduct, but
whether the supervisor's conduct
causes a "significant change in
employment status" of the victim.
On this view, the assertion that a
constructive discharge does not
constitute an official act of the
employer misconceives the legal
effect of a constructive discharge.
As noted previously, a constructive
discharge is, in effect, a termination. It imposes direct economic
harm identical to that of a terminated employee. When the work environment is so intolerable that the
employee has no choice but to
resign, the constructive discharge
becomes the act of the employer.
The employer's conduct has left the
employee no feasible alternative but
to resign. The resignation has been
forced on the employee by the
employer's conduct; it is not a voluntary choice of the employee.
Moreover, a constructive discharge
is often ratified by the employer.
There is always some paperwork
involved even when an employee
resigns, thus providing the company
with an opportunity to monitor the
circumstances. The employer is on
notice that the employment relationship has been severed, providing
an opportunity to question the
cause of the separation.
Lastly, holding the employer strictly
liable for a constructive discharge
caused by supervisory harassment
serves Title VII's policy objective of
preventing sexual harassment from
occurring by encouraging employers
to be watchful for harassment in
their workplaces, lest they be held
accountable when their supervisors'
harassing conduct forces employees
to resign.

SIGNIFICANCE
The issue of employer liability for
supervisory harassment that causes
a constructive discharge is one that
has divided the courts of appeals
since the Ellerth decision was handed down. Thus, a resolution of this
issue will provide needed clarity and
guidance for both the lower courts
and employers.
But, as the United States noted in
its amicus brief in this case, the
overlap between the factors to consider in determining whether an
employee's resignation in response
to intolerable conditions is a reasonable response, and the elements of
the employer's affirmative defense,
may mean that the Supreme Court's
decision will actually affect the
outcome in only a small category
of supervisory sexual harassment
cases.
Finally, it is possible that the Court
will take this opportunity to directly
address the issue of constructive
discharge and provide definite
guidelines for the lower courts to
apply in deciding what facts an
employee has to prove in order
to claim that a resignation meets
the requirements for a constructive
discharge.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Pennsylvania State Police
(Gerald J. Pappert (717) 787-1144)
For Nancy Drew Suders (Donald
A. Bailey (717) 221-9500)

AMIcus BRIEFS
In Support of Pennsylvania State
Police
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States (Peter Buscemi (202)
739-5190)
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American Bar Associatin

Equal Employment Advisory
Council (Ann Elizabeth Reesman
(202) 789-8600)
Society for Human Resource
Management (Allan H. Weitzman
(561) 241-7400)
United States (Theodore B.
Olson, Solicitor General (202) 5142217)
In Support of Nancy Drew Suders
American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (Laurence Gold (202)
842-2600)
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